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Chapter 16
SRI LANKA
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Area: 65,600 km2
Population: 19.67 million (2005 estimate)
Capital: Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte (Colombo is the location
of the Office of the President)
Language: Sinhala, Tamil, and English
Religion: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity
(Catholicism and Protestantism)
Government type: Republic
Chief of state: President Mahinda RAJAPAKSA
Currency: Sri Lankan rupee (LKR) (US$1 =100.49 rupees;
2005 average)
Fiscal year: Calendar year
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The issue of highest importance in 2005 was reconstruction followingthe tsunami that struck Sri Lanka at the end of 2004. However, due to
the delay in coordination within the government and consensus building
with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the government did
not submit the Post-Tsunami Organisational Management Structure (P-
TOMS) until June. Then, implementation of it was shelved when the
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional. 
With regard to peace, there was concern that the civil war might
resume because the government and the LTTE criticized each other for
violation of the Ceasefire Agreement. Furthermore, the assassination of
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar in August by the LTTE dealt a decisive blow
to peace. From December, clashes frequently occurred in the north and
east regions, and the LTTE even mobilized students and ordinary citizens. 
In November, the presidential election was held, and Mahinda
Rajapaksa, a candidate of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), won by a
slim margin over Ranil Wickremasinghe of the United National Party
(UNP) and assumed office as the fifth president. Prior to the election,
Mahinda signed an election agreement with the Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). The agreement,
given its hard-line stance toward the peace process up to that point as
shown in its statements opposing the federal system, was considered to be
skeptical of peace. However, following President Mahinda’s assumption of
office, a conference of all political parties was held and an attempt was
made to reach “southern consensus,” and so it appears that constructive
efforts for peace are being made.
Stalled Tsunami
Reconstruction and Peace on
the Verge of a Crisis
ETSUYO ARAI
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In economic aspects, rising prices were feared due to higher oil prices
and tsunami reconstruction. However, inflation was avoided thanks to the
central bank’s active financial policy and satisfactory agricultural produc-
tion, and the GDP growth rate is estimated at 5.9 percent.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
Joint Mechanisms Established for Tsunami Reconstruction
It was clear from the very beginning that, due to the massiveness of the
damage, it would be impossible for either the government or the LTTE to
tackle tsunami reconstruction single-handedly. Furthermore, just after
the tsunami occurred, the two sides were seen assisting each other by sup-
plying goods, etc., and so hope was held for a reconstruction through
mutual cooperation as well as an opportunity for resumption of the peace
negotiations which had been deadlocked since April 2003. However,
LTTE’s political wing leader S.P. Thamilchelvan, referring to the fact that
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had not entered the LTTE-controlled
area when he visited Sri Lanka on January 15 and the claim that relief
goods were not being sufficiently delivered to the LTTE-controlled area,
said, “It has dashed hopes of reconciliation.”
However, because the LTTE is banned by the United States and the
United Kingdom, countries and institutions providing aid cannot distrib-
ute funds directly to the LTTE. For this reason, a Joint Mechanism
became necessary to distribute aid funds. Norway undertook the role of
mediator, but very little progress was made.
In his speech for the new year in April, the president proposed the
establishment of a “Joint Mechanism for Tsunami Reconstruction” (here-
inafter referred to as the “Joint Mechanism”) as the basis for finally resolv-
ing this long-standing conflict. Due to pressure from the international
community to enable implementation of aid immediately, the president
became proactive toward the establishment of a mechanism even if it
entailed compromise with the LTTE, and she strongly wished to organize
it prior to the Sri Lanka Development Forum to be held in May.
Opposition to this was expressed by the domestic Sinhalese group com-
posed mainly of JVP and JHU. Because these groups formed part of the
coalition government, it was difficult to reach a decision without their
agreement. Meanwhile, the LTTE had already said in mid-April that it
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agreed with the Joint Mechanism plan, and it was becoming impatient
with the government. 
In June, the activity of the opposition faction grew even stronger, with
hard-line stances displayed through the hunger strike of the deputy chair-
person of the JHU at the Tooth Temple in Kandy and JVP’s intimidating
hints of withdrawal from the coalition. Furthermore in mid-June, the JVP
held a large-scale rally in Colombo and 39 JVP members of Parliament
withdrew from the coalition. Amidst the opposition of the Sinhalese
group, the Joint Mechanism proposal was submitted to the Parliament on
June 24 under the title of Post Tsunami Organisational Management
Structure (P-TOMS). Because the JVP strongly opposed it and repeatedly
interrupted the Speaker, the Parliament was adjourned. Outside the
Parliament as well, students assembled and the disorder reached
extremes, with the police firing shots. Because all the political parties
except JVP agreed to the establishment of P-TOMS despite the fact that
almost no debate had been conducted in the Parliament, it was announced
on June 25 that the government and the LTTE had signed P-TOMS.
The JVP and JHU were strongly opposed, but the government insisted
that establishment of the Joint Mechanism was a necessity and that the
proposed content was realistic. This was because countries and institu-
tions providing aid could not, for the reason stated above, offer funds
directly to the LTTE. Furthermore, even the Sri Lankan government
wished to avoid providing funds directly to the LTTE because that would
unnecessarily acknowledge the LTTE’s right to negotiate with foreign
countries as well as lead to higher international recognition of the LTTE.
Even so, the tsunami victims in the LTTE-controlled area could not sim-
ply be ignored. In P-TOMS, the government positioned the LTTE as one
of the executing agencies, but makes no mention of giving the LTTE
authority. The government thought that it could use this opportunity to
draw the LTTE into the democratic process and make progress toward
peace. However, what was problematic for the Sinhalese group about P-
TOMS was the very authority given to the LTTE.
The government positioned P-TOMS purely as mechanism for imple-
menting reconstruction aid and considered the LTTE as one of the con-
stituent agents. That is to say, P-TOMS was managed by institutions at
three levels, the District Committee, the Regional Committee, and the
High-Level Committee. The function of the District Committees was to
gather information on reconstruction needs from various related persons,
prioritize those needs, and submit a reconstruction plan to the Regional
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Committees. According to the government, District Committees are the
central organizations in the implementation of reconstruction, with “99
percent of the relief efforts and reconstruction work” being carried out by
district-level government agencies and NGOs. Members of the District
Committees were appointed by the president, but no LTTE members were
included among them. Even if groups close to the LTTE were included,
the LTTE itself was not included, and so it was considered politically safe.
In response, the opposition faction regarded the LTTE’s role in the
Regional Committees as important. The job of the Regional Committees
was to prioritize the aid implementation plans submitted by the District
Committees, approve them, and apportion funds. Of the 10 members of
the Regional Committees, five were from the LTTE, and the remainder
was representatives of the government and Muslim residents. The chair-
person was also selected from among the LTTE members. The JVP, JHU,
and the media were concerned that the LTTE would exploit this author-
ity. They also adopted a hard-line stance with regard to the secession and
independence of the LTTE and criticized P-TOMS as “infringing on the
sovereignty of the nation of Sri Lanka.” 
One problem in P-TOMS was its lack of consideration for regional dif-
ferences. There was a majority of Tamil residents in the districts of
Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, and these districts were actually under the
control of the LTTE. However, in the districts of Ampara, Batticaloa,
Trincomalee, and Jaffna, the LTTE was not necessarily in control. In spite
of this, P-TOMS prescribed the LTTE’s status as the same in all districts.
Those who argued against P-TOMS asserted that there were worries about
the rights of Muslim and Sinhalese residents in the areas not controlled by
the LTTE in the north and the east. The leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC), Rauff Hakeem, protested that no Muslim resident was
included among the signatories of P-TOMS and that Muslim residents
were not a minority that needed protection in Ampara and Batticaloa, etc.,
and he declared a boycott of P-TOMS. From the end of June through July,
Muslim residents in all parts of eastern Sri Lanka frequently held protest
gatherings against P-TOMS. 
JVP members of Parliament claimed in court that P-TOMS, which had
required more than six months from the occurrence of the tsunami and
involved many complications to achieve, was unconstitutional and
invalid. The Supreme Court pointed out two problem points in P-TOMS
in July. The first was a problem with the establishment of a Regional
Committee in Kilinochchi. Access would be difficult if a committee with
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the authority to approve reconstruction projects was established in
Kilinochchi, an LTTE-controlled area, as prescribed by the mechanism
plan, and so there was concern that the opinions of minority groups
would not be respected in the decision-making process. The second prob-
lem pointed out by the court was that, in P-TOMS, an international insti-
tution was supposed to manage the regional funds for the project imple-
mentation, but an auditor should handle this responsibility to ensure
transparency and accountability. The Supreme Court ordered that fund
operation under this framework be frozen for the time being until the
court issues its final decision on whether or not the operation of P-TOMS
violates the Constitution. 
Subsequently, the newly inaugurated President Mahinda set up the
Reconstruction and Development Agency (RDA) on December 1 as the
institution for reconstruction and development in place of P-TOMS. A
businessman said to be close to the LTTE assumed the position of repre-
sentative. It turned out that the JVP and JHU, who had vehemently
opposed the establishment of P-TOMS, quietly watched the establish-
ment of this agency. It is said that the difference in their attitude was due
to the fact that, whereas P-TOMS was an initiative of a president near the
end of her term, the RDA was established by a president who had just
been inaugurated. 
Presidential Election
The president of Sri Lanka is limited to two terms of six years each, and a
third term is forbidden. President C.B. Kumaratunga was inaugurated in
October 1994, and she was reelected in the presidential election that was
held one year early, in December 1999. Consequently, Kumaratunga’s
second term of office was to last for six years from the second election,
until the end of 2005. However, Kumaratunga insisted that she should
serve the full 12 years of two terms, until the end of 2006. In this regard,
the Supreme Court issued a judgment on August 26 that a presidential
election should be held at the end of 2005. Several weeks before the
Supreme Court’s decision, both the ruling and the opposition parties had
informally decided on candidates, and they had begun to organize in
anticipation of the election.
Mahinda Rajapaksa of the SLFP approached the JVP and JHU from
around the time of the Supreme Court decision, pursued negotiations
during the period when President Kumaratunga was visiting China
(August 30 to September 4), and by September 5 the JVP has already
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announced its support, with conditions attached, for Mahinda. Those
conditions took a hard line toward the LTTE and included the cancella-
tion of P-TOMS, preservation of a unified nation, and review of the role of
the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement and the role of Norway as mediator.
Likewise, an election agreement was signed on September 13 with JHU,
which had indicated doubts concerning the LTTE and the peace process
heretofore. 
Registration of candidates closed on October 7, and then the real cam-
paign began in preparation for voting day on November 17. There were 13
candidates, but the campaign became a single combat between Mahinda
Rajapaksa of the SLFP and Ranil Wickremasinghe of the UNP. Violence
during the campaign period was feared, but as a result of unprecedentedly
tough regulations, such as restrictions on where election posters could be
displayed by registered candidates, there was little trouble among sup-
porters of different candidates.
With regard to peace, which was the largest point of contention,
Mahinda demanded that Sri Lanka be a unitary state and brought up
doubts over the role of Norway which had been the mediator since 1999,
and he asserted that a change was needed. Furthermore, he denied the
possibility of a federation, which has been regarded as the most likely
prospect for a political resolution to the ethnic conflict and with which
the LTTE had once been close to agreement. He was rigidly uncompro-
mising toward the LTTE, proposing disarmament prior to negotiations,
negotiations conducted within a predetermined limited time frame, and
reconsideration of the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement and role of Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Meanwhile, Ranil respected the out-
comes of previous negotiations such as the Oslo Declaration and the
Tokyo Declaration. In short, Ranil adopted a stance of searching for a final
resolution through constitutional amendment and national referendum
under a framework based on a federation, and his stance included the
boosting of the efficiency of the monitoring system together with
strengthening the existing Ceasefire Agreement. In the area of the econ-
omy, whereas Mahinda was advocating opposition to privatization of
banks, electric power, transportation, and ports, etc., Ranil supported the
continued implementation of an open policy.
In addition to these policies, there was another major difference
between the two candidates. Ranil supported the continuation of the
existing peace process. In contrast, Mahinda appealed to the electorate
with the message “A new beginning, a new Sri Lanka.” Because Mahinda
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had not been involved in the peace process and devolution conducted up
until then, he was able to approach the debate in a different fashion. With
regard to the election campaign as well, whereas the UNP conducted its
campaign primarily though media such as television and newspapers,
Mahinda traveled to villages together with the JVP and deployed an anti-
LTTE campaign. The JVP, with which Mahinda had signed an election
agreement, excelled at this kind of strategy. 
Differences in the characters of Mahinda and Ranil can also be pointed
out. Mahinda appealed with his proximity to the people. In contrast to
Ranil, who had an image of being from the elite class in Cololmbo and
unable to mingle with ordinary people, many people felt close to Mahinda
because he was from the south and spoke Sinhalese better than English. 
In the initial phase of the election campaign, discord was heard from
within the SLFP. In short, it was due to the fact that Mahinda has con-
cluded an election agreement on his own initiative with the JVP and JHU
while President Kumaratunga was visiting China. Sufficient debate had
not been conducted within the SLFP concerning the election agreement.
President Kumaratunga displayed strong disapproval when she returned
and announced in a letter that the election agreement “completely violates
party regulations.” Subsequently, however, President Kumaratunga said
to the state-owned media, “I fully support Mahinda as the SLFP presiden-
tial candidate,” but she was not actively involved in supporting Mahinda’s
campaign and instead was traveling elsewhere during important periods
in the campaign. 
The LTTE Strategy and the Election Results
The contest was almost even between Mahinda, who had the support of
Sinhalese who wanted to elect the first president from the south, and
Ranil, who had the support of urban Sinhalese and Muslims, and so the
vote of the Tamils was considered decisive in determining the outcome.
The Tamils in the north and the east were thought to support Ranil, who
was enthusiastic about the existing peace process. The reason they sup-
ported Ranil is that, during the UNP administration from December 2001
to February 2004, then Prime Minister Ranil effected the Ceasefire
Agreement and then held negotiations six times. Contrarily, the SLFP was
critical, saying that the UNP’s negotiation methods made too many com-
promises to the LTTE. Consequently, for the LTTE, the negotiating part-
ner who was agreeable was the UNP, and it was thought that the LTTE
would support the UNP.
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However, the LTTE announced publicly on November 6 that it would
remain neutral with regard to the elections. In an interview,
Thamilchelvan said that he had “no interest” in the Sinhalese election.
The LTTE did not use violent methods against the Tamil residents in the
north, but it clearly pressured them to abstain from voting. As a result, the
voter turnout in the north and east was extremely low, at 1.1 percent in
Jaffna and 1.3 percent in Mullaitivu. 
As a result, Mahinda secured victory with 4.88 million votes (50.3 per-
cent of valid votes), but he won by only 180,000 votes over Ranil, who
received 4.70 million votes (48.4 percent) (see Table 16.1). The result
may have been different if the Tamils, who number 700,000 in Jaffna
alone, had voted. 
The background for the LTTE’s non-support of Ranil can be detected
in the speech by Prabhakaran (see below) during Hero’s Week and the
speech by Anton Balasingham, a political advisor to the LTTE who lives in
London. The LTTE’s lack of trust in Ranil is made clear in these speeches.
In short, despite the fact that there was some sort of agreement concern-
ing self-government of the north and east made between the UNP and
LTTE prior to the 2001 Parliamentary elections, Ranil did not abide by
that agreement, and moreover he caught the LTTE in a trap by inviting
the international community to become involved in the Sri Lankan peace
process. In other words, the LTTE thinks that it lost freedom to act due to
the intervention of the international community. In addition to that, it is
held that this situation incited LTTE Colonel Karuna, leading to a split of
the LTTE and throwing it into confusion.
On the other hand, there is also the view that sees the LTTE as having
made a clever choice in its response to the international community. For
example, the LTTE leader Balakumaran claims that, through this election,
the intentions of the Sinhalese with regard to the Tamil problem became
clear. In other words, in this election where almost no Tamils partic-
ipated, the defeat of Ranil, who was enthusiastic about resolving the prob-
lem through dialogue, proves that the Sinhalese are taking a hard-line
stance with regard to resolution of the Tamil problem. The LTTE was sat-
isfied with the election result because it showed clearly to the interna-
tional community the “hard-line intentions of the Sinhalese majority.”
The election results did not reflect the will of the Tamil people because
the LTTE essentially prevented voting by the Tamils. However, no specific
violence or threats have been revealed, and so the international commu-
nity was unable to censure the LTTE.
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Table 16.1. Votes and Turnout by District in the Presidential Elections
Number Share (%) Number Share (%)
District
Mahinda Ranil
Western:
Colombo
Gampaha
Kalutara
Central:
Kandy
Matale
Nuwara Eliya
Southern:
Galle
Matara
Hambantota
Northern:
Jaffna
Vavuniya
Eastern:
Batticaloa
Digamadulla
Trincomalee
North Western:
Kurunegala
Puttalam
North Central:
Anuradhapura
Polonnaruwa
Uva: 
Badulla
Moneragala
Sabaragamuwa:
Ratnapura
Kegalla
Total
534,431
596,698
341,693
315,672
120,533
99,550
347,233
279,411
202,918
1,967
17,197
28,836
122,329
55,680
468,507
160,686
231,040
110,499
192,734
126,094
294,260
239,184
4,887,152
(47.96)
(54.78)
(55.48)
(44.30)
(48.09)
(27.97)
(58.41)
(61.85)
(63.43)
(25.00)
(20.36)
(18.87)
(42.88)
(37.04)
(52.26)
(48.14)
(55.08)
(52.61)
(45.18)
(56.94)
(53.01)
(51.02)
(50.29)
569,627
481,764
266,043
387,150
125,937
250,428
239,320
165,837
112,712
5,523
65,798
121,514
159,198
92,197
418,809
169,264
182,956
97,142
226,582
92,244
252,838
223,483
4,706,366
(51.12)
(44.23)
(43.20)
(54.33)
(50.25)
(70.37)
(40.26)
(36.71)
(35.23)
(70.20)
(77.89)
(79.51)
(55.81)
(61.33)
(46.72)
(50.71)
(43.62)
(46.25)
(53.11)
(41.65)
(45.55)
(47.67)
(48.43)
Source: Compiled by the author from http://www.srilankanelectcions.com.
Note: Shaded areas indicate the candidate with the most votes in each district.
Happenings following the Election of the New President
Following the swearing-in ceremony on November 19, the new President
Mahinda called on LTTE to restart peace talks to discuss revision of the
Ceasefire Agreement. In December, the president requested the
Norwegian government to continue in the future in its role as mediator in
the peace process. Here not only did the president not use the word “uni-
tary state” which he had used during the campaign, he even referred to
devolution of power. Nor did he refer to a time limit for negotiations. This
was interpreted as an effort to change to a more practical course.
It may be necessary to consider the fact that the JVP and the JHU are
included in the new government. The United States and other countries
are plainly cautious about this point. However, there are times when even
the JVP and the JHU display a flexible stance toward a federal system.
Furthermore the government also has the support of many political par-
ties and groups in addition to the JVP and the JHU. It may appear to be
extremely difficult to compile the broad variety of opinions of these enti-
ties, but conversely the possibility cannot be ignored that such elements
may work to an advantage in the future. This is because the so-called
“southern consensus” has been ignored in the peace process up to now. If
the “southern consensus” recognizes a federal system, even if some time is
required to reach that consensus, then the basis for negotiations will most
likely be strengthened.
Internal Split of LTTE
Peace negotiations have been stalled since April 2003. Reasons include
disorder of national politics, implementation of general elections (in April
2004), and failure by both side to fulfill the Ceasefire Agreement.
However, the greatest of all the reasons was the worsening of the internal
split of the LTTE.
Already in February, the eastern political leader of the LTTE was killed
by a member of the Karuna group. This did not lead to a large-scale battle,
but clashes occurred among opposed groups, and there were also deaths
among civilians and journalists who supported the respective groups. 
The LTTE claimed that the government was supporting the Karuna
group. The government did not officially admit this. However, the gov-
ernment did indicate the view that groups formed after February 2002
were not obligated to follow the stipulation of the Ceasefire Agreement to
disarm, and this obliquely gave approval to the activities of the Karuna
group. This point is a major obstacle to the reopening of peace negotia-
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tions. This is because the LTTE claims that it is the only representative of
the Tamils and it seeks separate independence. Other Tamil groups are
not permitted to criticize the LTTE. Of course the LTTE cannot support
Ranil, who engineered the split. Among the LTTE’s demands to the gov-
ernment, disarmament of all armed groups is included, and this clearly
refers to none other than the Karuna group. 
Assassination of the Foreign Minister
Another major obstacle to the progress of peace is the assassination of
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar in August. He was shot from the house
across from his as he came out of his swimming pool. Since Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar’s assumption of office in 1994, he had appealed vig-
orously to various governments to designate the LTTE as a banned group
so that the LTTE’s overseas bases of activity and fund procurement
sources would be cut off. As a result, the LTTE was recognized as a terror-
ist organization and its activities were banned in Malaysia in 1996, in the
United States in 1997, and in the United Kingdom in 2000. For this rea-
son, it is said that Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, even though he was
Tamil, was placed on the LTTE assassination list next after the president. 
In her speech immediately after the assassination, the president did
not criticize the LTTE by name, and she called on the people to remain
calm. However, in the president’s comments conveyed the following day
by a government spokesperson, the LTTE was strongly criticized as “ter-
rorists.” The LTTE denied committing the crime on its own website and
suggested that it may have been committed by a different organization
since there are other groups that oppose the resumption of peace negotia-
tions. However, LTTE is the only group in Sri Lanka that could possibly
have carried out such a carefully planned crime.
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar was a Christian Tamil, and after receiving
an education at a domestic university, he studied in the United Kingdom.
At university there, he was one of the few Asians to become a student rep-
resentative, and he became an attorney in the United Kingdom.
Subsequently, he was also active in the International Labour Organization
(ILO). Kadirgamar was known as a sportsman, and the people felt affection
for him. It will be difficult to wipe away the people’s distrust of the LTTE
following his assassination. The EU hardened its attitude toward the LTTE
following the assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar and decided to
ban the entry of LTTE members into EU countries. Since then, the EU has
been studying designation of the LTTE as a banned group. 
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Despite the antipathy of the people, the government chose to continue
negotiations with the LTTE, which was regarded with certainty as the
assassin of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar. The statements of the govern-
ment spokesperson say that the government’s intention is to avoid at all
costs the resumption of hostilities. 
Speech by Prabhakaran and Clashes Starting in December
Every year at the end of November, the LTTE holds a “Hero’s Week” to
commemorate the birthday of Prabhakaran and those who have died in
the civil war and suicide bombings. At that time, Prabhakaran customarily
gives a speech. In his speech this time, while practically and realistically
talking about Mahinda, who changed his policies after the presidential
election, he demanded substantial measures for self government. Namely,
he made it clear that “If the new government rejects our urgent appeal, we
will, next year, in solidarity with our people, intensify our struggle for
self-determination.”
According to Prabhakaran’s statement of “next year” in his speech, it
seemed that the LTTE was behaving so as to give the government time to
search for a political resolution. However shortly after the speech, on
December 4, clashes began to erupt frequently in the north and east.
Attacks were also conducted where land mines were planted to blow up
military vehicles. Furthermore, the LTTE adopted a strategy different
from its earlier one. In short, students and civilian organizations were
mobilized; police and military facilities as well as government-related
facilities were attacked in an effort to provoke a response from govern-
ment forces. The LTTE called this the “people’s war.”
There were two reasons why the LTTE undertook these kinds of
attacks. The first is that Mahinda, who took a rigidly uncompromising
stance against the LTTE, has assumed office. If the government counter-
attacked, the LTTE could make a case with the international community
that the “belligerent government had launched an attack.” Second, it is
likely that the LTTE attacked because it considered itself to be superior
to government forces in terms of equipment and quality of soldiers. As
supporting evidence, it can be pointed out that the LTTE admitted to
possessing aircraft as of March 2005. However, the military and the
police did not overreact as the LTTE had hoped they would. They con-
tinued to respond calmly even in cases where previously panic would
have ensued, which would have given the LTTE an advantageous
excuse. 
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For this reason the critical situation became prolonged. To flee from
the fighting and calamities accompanying it, Tamil people moved from
the government-controlled area to the LTTE-controlled area. According
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 6,000
Tamil residents fled. Not only were there clashes as already mentioned
between the LTTE, the military, and the Karuna group, but anti-LTTE
Muslim groups also engaged in the melee, and conditions became rather
grave in the north and east. According to the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM), the number of dead due to clashes between the LTTE
with the government forces, police, and other anti-LTTE groups since
December reached 120 persons.
ECONOMY
Due to favorable weather conditions and the effects of the ceasefire in the
north and east, rice production increased 20.5 percent during the Maha
2004/5 (September 2004 to March 2005) and 28.7 percent during the Yala
(April to August) 2005. The volume of rubber production was satisfac-
tory, displaying an increase of 10.2 percent YOY, but tea, up 2.2 percent,
and coconuts, down 7.7 percent, were in a slump. Production of agricul-
tural products for domestic consumption was satisfactory and contributed
to price stability.
The trade deficit increased 12.2 percent YOY. Although exports
amounted to US$6,346.70 million, an increase of 10.2 percent YOY, total
imports were US$8,863.20 million, a 10.8 percent increase, because
imports of goods for tsunami reconstruction swelled and the value of
crude oil imports increased 45 percent YOY due to higher oil prices.
However, because remittances amounted to US$1,968.00 million, an
increase of 25.8 percent, the current account deficit shrank. The interna-
tional balance of payments is expected to post a surplus of US$500 mil-
lion due to the influx of reconstruction funds from overseas. Foreign cur-
rency reserves as of December 2005 were US$2.7 billion, equivalent to 3.7
months of imports (and as of December 2004 were US$2.2 billion, equiv-
alent to 3.3 months of imports).
Among Sri Lanka’s export items, clothing has usually accounted for
approximately 60 percent. The Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) was com-
pletely abolished at the end of 2004, and there was concern over the
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potential effects of that. However, despite expectations to the contrary,
exports of fiber products grew by 3.0 percent.
The economic growth rate in 2005 gradually rose, from 4.4 percent in
the first quarter, to 6.0 percent in the second and 6.7 percent in the third.
The growth rate for the first half of 2005 was 5.1 percent and for the year
as a whole is estimated at 5.9 percent. Major contributions were made by
service industries such as telecommunications, ports, and transportation
and by the construction sector.
Prices skyrocketed in the first half of the year due to higher oil prices
worldwide and demand from tsunami reconstruction. In the second half
of the year, food prices cooled off, and the central bank actively con-
ducted open market operations and also raised the policy interest rate a
total of 1.25 percent over four times (in May, June, September, and
December). Due to this, the inflation rate for the year as a whole settled at
11.8 percent.
Although there was concern that the tsunami would affect tourism,
the annual number of tourists declined only 3.0 percent YOY, to 549,300.
However, tourism income (US dollar base) dropped 20.7 percent YOY.
This was due to the fact that the number of days spent per tourist was
shorter than before. Moreover, there has not yet been a visible recovery in
the number of tourists traveling to tourist spots in the disaster area.
State of Tsunami Reconstruction
Due to the tsunami that struck Sri Lanka on December 26, 2004, over
30,000 people died, as many as 4,000 are missing, and one year after the
disaster, 500,000 people were still displaced. The tsunami caused US$1
billion (4.9 percent of the GDP) in damages, and it is estimated that
US$1.8 billion is necessary for reconstruction.
On January 6, an emergency summit meeting for aid to disaster-
stricken countries was held in Jakarta, and 45 countries, regions, and
institutions announced donations totaling US$4,362.49 million. On
January 12, the Paris Club (a meeting of major creditor countries) agreed
to grant a grace period on debt payments from the disaster-stricken coun-
tries. The seven advanced nations (G7) who are the main members of the
club had already decided in Jakarta to extend the time period for debt pay-
ment, and at this meeting the number of countries extending such finan-
cial assistance expanded to 19. As a country eligible for this financial
assistance, Sri Lanka had payment of US$328 million deferred. Thailand
and India, out of fear that acceptance of financial assistance would lower
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their international creditworthiness, declined to request deferment of debt
repayments. At the Sri Lanka Development Forum held in Kandy in May,
approximately 50 countries, regions, and aid organizations participated,
and US$2.2 billion in funds was offered. There was concern over the pos-
sible outbreak of contagious diseases in the refugee camps, but thanks to
this emergency assistance, no such crisis arose.
Reconstruction work is continuing without an institution to apportion
the public aid funds from overseas. The government appointed the Task
Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) and Task Force for Relief
(TAFOR), and they are taking charge of reconstruction and relief efforts.
In addition to the government, while NGOs from overseas as well as
regions and communities are productively undertaking reconstruction
work and aid organizations are pairing up with areas in need, there are
also areas which cannot be reached by assistance. The supply of goods is
relatively smooth, but long-term support to attain self-support and post-
traumatic psychological care need to be continued.
The government banned construction of housing within 100 meters of
the coast in the south and within 200 meters of the coast in the north and
east. However, due to opposition from residents, the buffer zone was
revised to 25 to 50 meters in the south and 50 to 100 meters in the north
and east.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Relations with India
In the economic sphere and in tsunami reconstruction support, relations
between Sri Lanka and India are proceeding satisfactorily. With regard to
peace, India made the announcement that it supports the policies of the
Sri Lankan government. However, India has not altered its cautious stance
over actual intervention in the peace process. 
Progress was made from the end of 2004 in ironing out differences for
the signing of a military agreement between Sri Lanka and India. In return
for signing the military agreement, Sri Lanka set forth various proposals
for cooperation with India, including India’s usage of the Trincomalee
Port and the Palali military base in Jaffna and assistance in the
Sethusamudram Ship Canal Project (dredging of the Palk Strait to enable
passage by large ships). When the Indian deputy foreign minister visited
Sri Lanka in May 2005, the relations between the two countries were
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good, as evidenced by the declaration that India would wholeheartedly
support the policy of the Sri Lankan government with regard to peace and
the statement concerning regional security that “Sri Lanka’s security is
India’s security.” Even in India’s 2005 annual report, the danger posed by
LTTE was noted again, and so it was thought that the signing of the mili-
tary agreement was imminent. In June, India’s foreign minister actually
said, “[a Defence Cooperation Agreement between the two countries] is in
the process of being finalised.” Despite this, the agreement was not
signed. The primary reason is because differences could not be ironed out
concerning usage of an airport in Jaffna. Sri Lanka was reluctant to acqui-
esce to India’s demand that usage of the airport be limited to their two
countries. 
With regard to peace in Sri Lanka, India did not alter its stance of sup-
porting Sri Lanka as a unified nation, but simultaneously India main-
tained a certain distance from the peace process. For example, when
President Mahinda made his first visit to India after his inauguration at
the end of December, he anticipated India’s cooperation in achieving
peace. Specifically, he anticipated that India would, at minimum, partic-
ipate as cochair in peace conferences. However, with regard to Sri Lankan
peace, India only reconfirmed its support for the “internal political
process” which Sri Lanka and the LTTE had already agreed upon. In the
joint statement, neither the words “unified nation” which Mahinda had
used during the election campaign, nor the words “federal system” which
elicited an adverse reaction from both the Sinhalese hardliners and the
LTTE, was mentioned. Instead, the expression used was “maximum devo-
lution which preserves the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka” and
thus neutrality was maintained.
The extreme caution of India with regard to the issue of peace in Sri
Lanka was indicated when India’s deputy foreign minister visited Sri
Lanka in May by the fact that he inspected Trincomalee and held talks
with members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) but did not meet the
LTTE leaders. This stood in strong contrast to the fact that representatives
of other foreign countries visited the LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi. 
Relations with China
While India is unable to build a close relationship with Sri Lanka because
of matters related to the LTTE and peace issues, China is a country that is
increasing its presence in Sri Lanka. China was one of the first countries
to announce its assistance for tsunami reconstruction, for which Sri Lanka
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is grateful. China is actively carrying out a reconstruction assistance plan,
and in April, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao went to Sri Lanka and visited
the sites where China was assisting with tsunami reconstruction. At the
end of August, with domestic politics in disarray over the upcoming pres-
idential election, President Kumaratunga visited China and endeavored to
strengthen relations. With regard to economic matters, Sri Lanka sounded
out China on funding for construction of a coal-fired power plant in
Puttalam, construction of an oil reserve area in Hambantota, the laying of
tracks for express trains on the 45 km route between Ratmalana and
Katunayake, and construction of an expressway between Colombo and
Katunayake. Signing of an agreement on the coal-fired power plant took
place in the presence of President Kumaratunga and Premier Wen Jiabao.
The construction of the power plant is to take place in three stages of 300
MW each. Despite the fact that it was decided at a cabinet meeting in
February to place an order for the construction of this power plant with
India’s National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), this decision was
overturned when the Chinese premier visited in April, and ultimately it
was decided that China would handle the construction. (India proposed
the Build Own Operate (BOO) method, and China proposed the Build
Operate Transfer (BOT) method.) With regard to military matters,
whereas it is difficult for India to conclude a military agreement with Sri
Lanka that includes provision of weapons due to historical circumstances
and domestic opposition, China faces no such restrictions. It appears that
the relationship between Sri Lanka and China will continue to strengthen
in the future.
ISSUES IN 2006
Given the frequent clashes since December, it was decided to hold talks
between the government and the LTTE. However, it proved difficult to
decide on the location of the talks. While the government sought to hold
the talks domestically or within Asia, the LTTE wished to hold them in
Norway. At last, talks were held in Switzerland on February 22 and 23,
2006. Intense exchanges took place, with the government demanding a
review of the defects in the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, and the LTTE
demanding disarmament of armed groups. The content of the joint state-
ment stated only that they would “observe the existing Ceasefire
Agreement” and take “all necessary measures to ensure that there will be
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no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions or killings.” Thus, the results
of the talks left both parties dissatisfied. 
What both parties desire the most is to avoid the resumption of war.
However, in domestic politics, Sinhalese extremist groups are beginning
to display threatening movements with regard to the president, who has
not taken any clear action for peace. Discord between the LTTE and the
Karuna group is also becoming conspicuous again. If no real progress is
made in peace talks as was seen in 2002 and 2003, then the Ceasefire
Agreement, which is already endangered, is likely to become even more
imperiled. 
The economy in 2005 was strong, buoyed by good weather and the
inflow of funds from overseas for tsunami reconstruction. Essentially, the
same trend is likely to continue in 2006. The course of peace negotiations
is certain to greatly affect the economy. 
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IMPORTANT DATES IN 2005
January 
6: Jakarta tsunami summit held. A joint statement was adopted welcoming
the advanced countries’ deferment of public debt repayment from disaster-
stricken countries. Japan declared assistance of US$500 million.
7: The president announced that she would directly control the tsunami aid
activities. 
8: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan inspected Hambantota and
Trincomalee. He did not enter the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE)–controlled area.
13: The government and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) talked
at Trincomalee. Matters became complicated by the government’s demand
for a list of distributed aid goods, and the LTTE left the talks. 
21: The Norwegian foreign minister and the Sri Lankan president held talks
concerning tsunami reconstruction and peace. 
- The LTTE political advisor Balasingham visited Sri Lanka and stated that
Norway was attempting to set up a joint agency for aid distribution in
LTTE-controlled areas. 
24: The Patriotic National Movement (PNM) insisted that NGOs working in
relation to tsunami assistance should be regulated. 
28: The government and LTTE talked concerning reconstruction. Anton
Balasingham stated that direct acceptance of aid goods has been aban-
doned.
February
7–9: The president visited Pakistan and signed a free trade agreement on
February 9. 
- The LTTE’s leader of the eastern political division was killed.
14: Anton Balasingham demands disarmament of militia groups by the gov-
ernment at a meeting in London with Norwegian representative Eric
Solheim. 
20: Former US president George H. W. Bush and former US president Clinton
visited and went to Matara. 
23: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) declared a firm refusal to talk based on
the Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). Negotiations continued with
LTTE. 
March 
1: Police announced the discovery of the remains of 29 persons from a train
struck by the tsunami. 
2: In Jaffna 10,000 people demonstrated against the government’s attack of
the LTTE and inadequate tsunami aid. 
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9: Anton Balasingham told Eric Solheim that the LTTE possesses aircraft and
that it possessed them prior to the Ceasefire Agreement. 
10: The LTTE sent a delegation to the EU.
17: Residents in the east who suffered damage from the tsunami petitioned the
president to ease housing restrictions to less than 200 meters from the
coast.
30: The LTTE threw a hand grenade into a vehicle carrying Eelam People’s
Democratic Party (EPDP) members.
- LTTE leader Thamilchelvan talked with the Finnish foreign minister in
Helsinki. He criticized the government for expanding its support of groups
opposed to the LTTE despite the ceasefire.
April 
1: The LTTE released seven child soldiers. 
4: In Batticaloa, a worker from the Ministry of Vocational and Technical
Training was attacked and by LTTE members and killed.
5: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) announced that the LTTE
fired on a naval ship flying the SLMM flag. There were no injuries.
8: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited. On April 9, a joint communique was
released.
13: An LTTE group announced, from South Africa where it was visiting, its
intention to restart negotiations 
14: The president stated in her new year’s address that the Joint Mechanism
proposed by Norway would most likely be the basis for a lasting solution
to the ethnic strife.
17: Eric Solheim visited and met with Muslim residents in Puttalam. 
21: Five LTTE members were killed in a clash with the Karuna group (in
Batticaloa).
23: Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, stated that the
US views the LTTE as a terrorist group and demands that it renounces vio-
lence.
28: Dharmeratnam Sivaram, a Tamil journalist, was kidnapped in Colombo
and killed.
May 
7: The president told government personnel that she failed to reach agree-
ment with JVP concerning the establishment of a Joint Mechanism.
9: The Indian foreign minister said in an interview that he was concerned
about LTTE possession of aircraft. 
15: Sinhalese extremists set up a statue of Buddha near a bus stop in
Trincomalee. 
16–17: A donor country meeting was held in Kandy, attended by 125 countries
and donor institutions. 
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- The Buddhist statue in Trincolmalee was destroyed by a hand grenade,
following which stores were closed and transportation came to a standstill.
18: The former mayor of Trincomalee was shot and killed in front of his resi-
dence.
22: Anura Bandaranaike, Minister of Industry, Tourism, and Investment
Promotion, set up an overseas office of the Board of Investment (BOI) in
Bangalore, India.
28: Former US President Clinton, acting as a UN special envoy, criticized the
LTTE for the crime of conscripting tsunami victims as child soldiers (in
Colombo).
June 
5: LTTE protested the fact that the government refused to transport LTTE
members in a government helicopter. 
6: The ethnic Sinhalese JHU deputy chairperson undertook a hunger strike,
until June 11, at the Tooth Temple in Kandy, in protest against the Joint
Mechanism.
10: The JVP chairperson announced that he would formally declare JVP’s
withdrawal from the coalition if the president did not retract the Joint
Mechanism by June 15. 
14: In Colombo, 10,000 JVP supporters rallied against the Joint Mechanism.
16: Thirty-nine JVP members of Parliament withdrew from the coalition.
- The president stated that the purpose of the Post-Tsunami Operational
Management Structure (P-TOMS) is to put the LTTE on the path toward
joining the democracy. 
18: India’s Minister of Shipping announced that the ground-breaking cere-
mony for the Sethusamudram Ship Canal Project between India and Sri
Lanka would be held in late June or early July in Madurai for security rea-
sons. 
23: The president held talks with leading Buddhist priests and handed them a
paper on P-TOMS. The president repeatedly emphasized that P-TOMS
would not threaten the security or territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
24: P-TOMS was deliberated by the Parliament. JVP was strongly opposed.
The police used tear gas on the 2,000 JVP supporters who gathered around
the Parliament building. Parliament was adjourned until July 5. 
27: JVP members claimed in court that P-TOMS was unconstitutional. 
- The World Bank and ADB released a joint statement saying that, despite
the Ceasefire Agreement, the investment environment in Sri Lanka was
unattractive due to political instability and lack of infrastructure.
July 
2: The United National Party (UNP) held a massive demonstration march
from southern cities, arriving in Colombo on July 12, to demand an early
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election (before December), a peace process led by Norway, and reduction
of prices. 
7: Foreign Minister Kadirgamar proposed a bill to put into practice an
international treaty for preventing donations of funds to terrorism, and the
bill was passed.
10: LTTE members including Sea Tiger were killed by a hand grenade attack
in Trincomalee. 
11: After learning of the murder of its members the previous day, LTTE
warned of the possibility of resumption of the war.
12: Demonstration held in Trincomalee. Eight police officers and soldiers
working to suppress the demonstration were injured.
13: LTTE withdrew more than 40 of its political affairs members from its east-
ern offices (Batticaloa, Trincomalee, and Ampara).
15: The Supreme Court decided that a portion of P-TOMS was unconstitu-
tional and ordered that implementation of that part be cancelled.
19: The cochairs of Sri Lankan peace warned that if the Ceasefire Agreement
did not function, then the international assistance system would collapse.
They insisted that the government and the LTTE needed to devise an
emergency method for preventing murders.
20: The LTTE warned that if the government did not take measures to stop
attacks, the Ceasefire Agreement would disintegrate. 
- Thamilchelvan told Norway’s deputy ambassador in Kilinochchi that he
refused direct talks with the government. This was because the govern-
ment was not implementing important articles of the Ceasefire Agreement. 
26: The president requested the cochairs to clarify their stance in negotiations
with the LTTE and to place pressure on the LTTE to halt violence.
- The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) chose Mahinda Rajapaksa as its
candidate in the next presidential election.
August 
12: An anti-LTTE television newscaster and her husband were killed by gun-
fire in Colombo.
- Foreign Minister Kadirgamar was killed by an unidentified gunman at his
residence. A state funeral was held on August 15.
18: The president sent a letter to the prime minister of Norway concerning the
fact that she wanted an emergency meeting with the LTTE to reconsider
the Ceasefire Agreement following the assassination of Foreign Minister
Kadirgamar. 
19: Anton Balasingham revealed on Tamilnet that talks would be held in Oslo
at the end of August between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE
concerning reconsideration of the Ceasefire Agreement. 
24: The UNP submitted one million signatures demanding the holding of a
presidential election at the end of 2005 to the election committee. 
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26: The Supreme Court ruled that the presidential election should be held in
2005. 
27: The UNP’s presidential candidate, Ranil Wickremasinghe, launched his
campaign. 
30: The president visited China. A Sri Lanka–China joint communique was
released on September 2.
September 
5: The JVP announced that it would support the candidacy of Mahinda
Rajapaksa, with conditions attached. 
8: Mahinda signed an agreement with JVP on abandonment of the federal
system plan, revision of the Ceasefire Agreement, and halting of privatiza-
tion.
12: The president stated on state-owned media her wholehearted support for
Mahinda Rajapaksa as presidential candidate.
13: Mahinda Rajapaksa signed an election agreement with JHU in Kandy.
- In Norway, the opposition labor party won the election, and the adminis-
tration changed. In the new Cabinet, Eric Solheim was appointed as
Norway’s Minister of Development Cooperation. 
19: The cochairs cautioned that although criticism involving the naming of
names had been avoided in the assassination of Foreign Minister
Kadirgamar, peace was facing its most serious trial. 
26: The EU decided to refuse entry of LTTE members into EU countries. The
EU is currently debating whether to designate the LTTE as a banned
group. 
27: The UNP publicly releases its presidential election manifesto. 
30: SLFP leaders recognize that there is a rift between the president and the
prime minister. 
October 
6: The Norwegian ambassador talked with the LTTE in Kilinochchi and
requested the LTTE to stop violence and the recruitment of child soldiers.
There was also discussion of the EU’s refusal to allow entry by the LTTE.
- Near a newspaper company (in Colombo) connected with Douglas
Devananda, a Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) member of
Parliament, a car bomb exploded.
11: The Sri Lankan government promised US$100,000 for the Pakistan earth-
quake. 
12: The headmaster of Central College in Jaffna was murdered in the college
by the LTTE. The headmaster undertook construction of facilities and
educational radio programs using funds from Douglas Devananda, and he
was strongly opposed to the conscription of child soldiers by the LTTE.
14: The government announced that it would allow tsunami survivors to build
houses near the coast. The distance restrictions were reduced from 100
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meters to 25 to 50 meters in the south and from 200 meters to 50 to 100
meters in the east.
15: The former SLMM chief said during a visit to Sri Lanka that the Sri Lankan
government and LTTE are in a state of war and public safety is in an
extremely serious condition. 
18: Mahinda released his manifesto (Mahinda Vision). 
30: A military intelligence operative was murdered in Kiribathgoda.
November 
6: It was reported that the LTTE would maintain neutrality in the election.
8: The budget bill was submitted to Parliament. The opposition parties were
absent in protest of the submission of the bill prior to the election.
13: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit meet-
ing was closed after adopting the Dhaka Declaration which mentioned
regional cooperation against terrorism and cooperation for a disaster
response system as well as poverty reduction.
17: The fifth presidential election was held. The election committee
announced that voting was unrestricted and fair. 
23: The president appointed 25 Cabinet members and 52 vice ministers and
ministers without portfolios. The president himself held dual office as
Minister of Defence, Public Security, Law and Order and Minister of
Finance and Planning. 
- Tamil people living in Europe held an anti-LTTE demonstration in
Brussels seeking to ban activities of the LTTE in the EU.
25: The new session of Parliament opened. The president declared the signing
again of a Ceasefire Agreement that is effective in preventing terrorism.
27: Prabhakaran, leader of the LTTE, made a speech during Hero’s Week,
declaring that fighting would be intensified if the new president did not
meet the political wishes of the Tamils in 2006.
December 
3: At least two Tamils died in a clash between Tamils and Muslims. The mili-
tary was sent to Trincomalee. 
4: A military truck hit a landmine in Jaffna and six soldiers were killed. 
6: Seven government soldiers were killed by a landmine in Jaffna. 
- LTTE killed four members of the Karuna group including a commander
in Ampara.
7–11: Akashi, a representative of the Japanese Government (in charge of peace-
building and restoration/reconstruction in Sri Lanka) visited and offered to
mediate talks between the government and LTTE. 
19: The military fired into the air during a student demonstration in Jaffna. 
20: The cochairs sought to halt the violence in the Sri Lankan peace process
(in Brussels). 
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- Students carrying sticks, chains, and rocks attacked a military jeep near
Jaffna University.
22: The LTTE attacked a military ship off the coast of Talaimannar.
23: A bus carrying navy personnel was attacked in Mannar and 13 died. 
24: The cochairs, excluding the United States, met with Thamilchelvan. 
- In Jaffna at least five LTTE members died as a result of a clash with the
military.
- Joseph Pararajasingham, a member of Parliament on the National List of
the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) was shot and killed by an unidentified
gunman while attending Christmas mass in Batticaloa. 
27–30: The president visited India and announced a joint statement on December
30.
- Ten soldiers died due to a landmine in Jaffna.
29: SLMM warned that the resumption of war in Sri Lanka was not distant. 
31: The police and military undertook a large-scale search in Colombo and
took 903 Tamils into custody.
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APPENDIX 16.2: LIST OF GOVERNMENT CABINET
MEMBERS
PRESIDENT
President, Defense and Finance : Mahinda Rajapaksa 
CABINET MINISTERS
Disaster Management : Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake 
Tourism: Anura Bandaranaike 
Post and Telecommunications, Rural Economic Promotion: D.M.
Jayaratne 
Justice and Law Reforms: Amarasiri Dodangoda 
Healthcare and Nutrition: Nimal Siripala de Silva 
Foreign Affairs, Ports and Civil Aviation: Mangala Samaraweera 
Railways and Transport, Petroleum and Petroleum Resource
Development: A.H.M. Fowzie 
Trade, Commerce, Consumer Affairs and Marketing Development,
Highways: Jeyaraj Fernandopulle 
Agriculture, Environment, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development:
Maitripala Sirisena 
Power and Energy: W.D.J. Seneviratne 
Children’s Development and Women Empowerment: Sumedha G.
Jayasena 
Public Administration and Home Affairs: Dr. Sarath Amunugama 
Media and Information: Anura Priyadarshana Yapa 
Urban Development and Water Supply: Dinesh Gunawardena 
Social Services and Social Welfare: Douglas Devananda 
Housing Construction: Ferial Ashraff 
Education: Susil Premajayantha 
Labor Relations and Foreign Employment: Athauda Seneviratne 
Rural Industries and Self Employment Promotion: S.B. Navinna 
Vocational and Technical Training: Piyasena Gamage 
Local Government and Provincial Councils: Janaka Bandara
Tennekoon 
Fisheries Housing Development: A.L.M. Athaullah 
Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion: Rohitha
Bogollagama 
Science and Technology: Prof. Tissa Vitharana 
Constitutional Affairs and National Integration: D.E.W. Gunasekara 
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NON-CABINET MINISTERS
Plantation Industries: Milroy Fernando 
Sports and Youth Affairs: Jeevan Kumaranatunga 
Samurdhi and Poverty Alleviation: Pavithra Wanniarachchi 
Indigenous Medicine: Tissa Karaliyadda 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources: Felix Perera 
Estate Infrastructure and Livestock: C.B. Ratnayake 
Coconut Development: Salinda Dissanayake 
Cultural and National Heritage: Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena 
Parliamentary Affairs: Prof. Wiswa Warnapala 
Fisheries Housing Development: M.N. Abdul Majid 
Resettlement: A. Risath Bathiyutheen
Disaster Relief Services: Ameer Ali Shihabdeen
Home Affairs: Chandrasiri Gajadeera 
Agriculture Development: Chamal Rajapakse 
Industrial Development: Kumar Welgama 
Highways: T.B. Ekanayake 
Foreign Employment Promotion: Rohitha Abeygunawardena 
Irrigation: Anwer Ismail 
Agrarian Services and Farmer Community Development: S.M.
Chandrasena 
Zoological and Botanical Gardens Promotion: Bandula Basnayaka 
Regional Development: Gunaratna Weerakoon 
Skills and Employment: Sripathy Sooriyaarachchi 
New Railway Track Development: Mahinda Amaraweera 
Rural Livelihoods Development: Jagath Pushpa Kumara 
Textile Industries: Jayatissa Ranaweera 
Public Bank Development: Wijedasa Rajapakse 
DEPUTY MINISTERS
Defence: Ratnasiri Wickremanayake
Rural Economic Promotion: Milroy Fernando 
Science and Technology: Salinda Dissanayake 
Religious Affairs: Tissa Karaliyadde 
Justice and Judicial Reforms, Constitutional Affairs and National
Integration: Dilan Perera 
Local Government and Provincial Councils: M.N. Abdul Majid 
Fisheries Housing Development: Chandrasiri Gajadeera 
Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion, Social Services
and Samurdhi Welfare: Jagath Pushpakumara 
Mahaweli, Children’s Development and Women Empowerment:
Ranaweera A. Jayatissa  
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Public Administration: T.B. Ekanayake 
Nation Building and Development: D.M. Dassanayake 
Labor: Mervyn Silva 
Environment and Irrigation: Pandu Bandaranayake 
Power: Mahindananda Aluthagamage 
Urban Development and Water Supply: Mahinda Amaraweera 
Healthcare and Nutrition: Jayaratna Herath 
Highways: Dayasritha Tissera 
Ports and Civil Aviation: Duminda Dissanayake 
Finance and Planning ,Higher Education: Ranjith Siyambalapaitiya 
Post and Telecommunications: Rohitha Abeygunawardena 
Rural Industries and Self Employment Promotion: Premalal Jayasekara 
Housing and Construction: Gunaratna Weerakoon 
Transport: Lasantha Alagiyawanna 
Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion: Suriya Sripathi
Consumer Services and Agriculture Marketing Development: Siripala
Gamlath 
Finance and Planning: Rohana Dissanayake 
Plan and Plan Implementation: H.A. Hussein Bhaila 
Education: Nirmala Kotelawala 
Trade and Commerce: H.R. Mithrapala 
Media and Information: Cegu Isadeen 
Foreign Affairs: Wijedasa Rajapakse 
Tourism : Arjuna Ranatunga
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APPENDIX 16.3: MAJOR STATISTICS
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Population (million)
Labour force (million)
Consumer price index (annual aver. change, %)
Unemployment rates (%)
Exchange rates (US$1=rupees)
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Recent Econimic Developments Highlight of 2005 and
Prospects for 2006, Key Economic Indicators.
18.7
6.7
14.2
7.8
89.36
2001
19.0 
7.1
9.6
9.1
95.66
2002
19.2
7.6
6.3
8.4
96.52
2003
19.4
8
7.6
8.3
101.19
2004
19.6
8.2
11.6
7.7
100.49
2005
1. General
Consumption expenditure
   Private
   Government
Gross domestic capital formation
   Private sector and public corporations
   Government
Exports of goods and non-factor services
Imports of goods and non-factor services
Gross domestic  produt at market prices
Growth rate of GDP (real)
Net factor income from aborad
Gross national product at market prices
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Recent Econimic Developments Highlight of 2005 and
Prospects for 2006, Table 3.
1,185,482
144,441
1,041,041
309,684
42,366
267,318
525,398
613,167
1,407,397
-1.5 
-23,830
1,382,220
2001
1,353,428
139,311
1,214,117
334,804
31,922
302,882
570,833
677,180
1,581,885
4.1 
-24,174
1,559,867
2002
1,481,164
139,268
1,341,896
388,757
40,766
347,991
632,907
741,667
1,761,161
6.0 
-16,535
1,741,763
2003
1,706,823
164,716
1,542,107
507,188
45,261
461,927
738,687
923,258
2,029,440
5.4 
-20,688
2,016,506
2004
1,968,654
202,942
1,765,712
625,793
64,571
561,222
805,426
1,043,706
2,356,167
5.3 
-28,654
2,345,852
2005
(Million rupee)
2. Gross National Product by Type of Expenditure (at current prices)
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Agriculutre
Mining & quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, water & gas
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Transport, storage & communication
Financial services, real estate & business services 
Public administration, defence, other social
activity, social and personal services
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Recent Econimic Developments Highlight of 2005 and 
Prospects for 2006, Table 2.
169,377
15,019
142,909
12,130
61,292
181,733
105,497
91,457
64,381
843,795
2001
173,623
14,858
145,864
12,044
60,796
191,505
113,525
99,820
65,213
877,248
2002
176,450
15,699
151,951
14,651
64,115
206,507
125,538
108,590
66,556
930,057
2003
175,149
16,946
159,696
14,282
68,332
218,993
142,680
114,661
69,154
979,894
2004
174,615
18,093
1,687,614
17,010
72,638
227,011
161,927
119,512
72,173
1,031,593
2005
(Million rupee)
3. Gross Domestic Product by Industries (at constant 1996 prices)
Import
 Agriculture
 Industry
 Mining
 Other
Export
 Condumer goods
 Intermediate goods
 Investment goods
 Other
Balance of trade
Source: Central Bank, Annual Report.
430,372
83,252
331,687
7,666
7,767
532,964
100,276
306,305
96,185
30,198
-102,592
2001
449,849
89,681
347,656
8,628
3,883
584,491
113,753
346,784
112,046
11,906
-134,641
2002
495,426
93,069
83,833
8,069
10,454
643,749
129,656
380,931
127,363
5,798
-148,322
2003
583,967
107,951
457,174
12,103
6,737
811,138
146,073
489,688
169,096
6,280
-227,170
2004
638,276
116,043
497,694
14,404
10,134
891,358
151,021
5,149,004
188,061
3,271
-253,082
2005
(Million rupee)
4. Imports and Exports
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Trade balance
Service, net
Income, net
Goods, services and income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account
Capital account
Financial account
Long term
Direct investment
Private, long term
Governmnet, long term, net
Short term
Errors and omissions
Overall balance
-1157.4
240.9
-280.9
-1,197.4
1,005.3
-192.1
196.7
338.6
163.4
172.2
-257.2
248.5
175.2
-123.0
220.2
2001
-1406.4
294.7
-252.8
-1,364.5
1,128.2
-236.3
65.0
377.9
275.1
185.5
-22.5
112.1
102.8
38.2
337.8
2002
-1538.8
398.6
-171.6
-1,311.8
1,240.3
-71.5
73.8
648.3
723.8
201.4
-31.9
554.3
-75.5
-148.5
502.1
2003
-2242.5
419.0
-203.7
-2,027.2
1,379.6
-647.6
63.5
571.6
684.0
227.0
18.2
438.8
-112.4
-192.7
-205.2
2004
-2806.0 
436.0
-285.4
-2,655.4
1,592.1
-1,063.3
268.3
825.7
748.4
295.3
44.8
408.3
77.3
0.0
295.2
2005*
(US$ million)
5. Balance of Payments
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Recent Econimic Developments Highlight of 2005 and 
Prospects for 2006, Table 11.
Note: * Estimated figures based on data to September 2005, inclusive.

